

## **PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA: *Trends, Achievements and Challenges***

**George Wachira**

Despite the many critical voices that have been raised and that shall no doubt be raised even in this meeting, it is undeniable that the NePAD initiative is the most interesting development to come out of Africa in a very long time, and has caused much excitement among the political, business and academic communities. It is only fair that we spend time trying to understand its implications for the peace and development of Africa.

I was asked to speak on the topic of peace-building in Africa, highlighting the progress, trends, and challenges. Accordingly, in this presentation, I will attempt to do three main things:

- a) Highlight what I see as the achievements and trends in peace-building in Africa in the last 10 or so years
- b) Indicate some of the key challenges and dilemmas posed by conflicts and peace-building, and
- c) Make some general observations about the NePAD, especially as it relates to Africa's peace.

### **PRELIMINARY COMMENT**

Before launching into those three areas, I want to make a preliminary comment about where I am "coming from". My comments and observations are from the vantage point of an NGO actor, with all its implications regarding perspective. For the last 12 years, I have had the privileged challenge of working for peace and conflict transformation in a number of countries in Africa. The Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), the organization I work for, was founded in 1984 at the height of the Horn of Africa famine and in response to the portrayal of that tragedy by the international media. The founders of NPI-Africa saw their mission as that of placing peace on the agenda of institutions in Africa, helping to develop the skills and capacity for resolving the conflicts, and helping weave a new and different story of hope for Africa.

NPI-Africa's work has covered four major areas:

- Track 2 mediation and conciliation by supporting religious and political leaders in Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda and Sudan in their respective peacemaking roles.
- Supporting grassroots peace-building and reconciliation work in Liberia, Ghana, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and DRC.
- Capacity building in conflict transformation and peace-building for peace workers in over 30 countries in Africa. Here, we have developed on-going collaboration with the Conflict Transformation Programme of the Eastern Mennonite University in Virginia, USA, and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding in Accra, Ghana.
- Organizing conferences and symposia on topical issues of concern to peace-building and Africa in general. This involves elements of networking and advocacy.

In general, we have seen our role as that of a resource organization available to people in conflict situations, accompanying and facilitating processes of peace-building and transformation. More importantly, we have seen our role as that of working with people to

reflect on, learn about, discover and articulate transformative values, attitudes and skills for the creation of peaceful, just and humane societies.

The work has afforded a privileged vantage point from which to interact and work with people in various conflict settings across Africa. It has also offered an opportunity to experience and engage with the dilemmas and challenges inherent in conflict settings in Africa.<sup>1</sup>

## **A “DUAL MANDATE” FOR PEACEBUILDING<sup>2</sup>**

Generally speaking, I suggest that the peace-building mission in Africa embraces two crucial and related elements, or what I want to call a “dual mandate.”

- a) The first entails working with parties in conflict to avert, resolve or transform specific conflicts. This can be thought of as both a reactive and a proactive mission. Working at this level calls for the existence of mechanisms, institutions and processes of dealing with conflict. It also poses the challenge of the development of the requisite skills, resources and capacities in conflict handling, such as mediation, peacekeeping, and reconciliation. My initial assessment is that the last 10 years have witnessed an increased awareness of this mandate, initially by non-governmental actors, but now increasingly by other actors such as regional integration and other governmental bodies, religious and academic institutions.
- b) The second mandate is a more proactive one. It calls for efforts aimed at placing Africa on the path to development and prosperity in ways that expand people’s choices, enhance the quality of life, and diminish possibilities of destructive conflicts. In turn, this calls for dealing with issues of political governance and economic development and sustainability of livelihoods, which are at the core of most conflicts. This mandate recognises that the conflict-generating context of Africa is a mix of local, national and international systems. I see NePAD as a potential—and the latest—promise in the direction of this second mandate.

## **PEACEBUILDING IN AFRICA: ACHIEVEMENTS AND TRENDS**

Having made those preliminary comments we now make some observations about the progress and trends in peace-building in Africa.

---

<sup>1</sup> The work has constantly brought me face to face with the despair, pain, atrocities and death that are a result of conflict. But the work has also brought me face to face with hope, transformation, resilience, solidarity, forgiveness and grace. I like telling stories and would have liked to share some of the stories and experiences with you. I believe that to really know what peace workers have been up to, what they have achieved and the challenges they have faced, you ought to give them a chance to tell stories. Real life stories offer much more learning than intellectualised reflections ever could. However, sharing of stories is beyond the scope of this presentation. This presentation is of a more general nature.

<sup>2</sup> I use the term “peace-building” generally to refer to any efforts aimed at the promotion of peace. I am aware that this conflicts with the definition of peace-building popularised by the UN’s Agenda for Peace, among others, where peace-building refers more or less to post-conflict efforts at sustaining peace. Some have argued that to use the term peace-building to refer to efforts during conflict is contradictory because “there is no peace to build”. But if we borrow from the analogy of building a house, saying that we cannot do peace-building during the conflict is tantamount to claiming that we cannot build a house because it does not exist. In contrast, I use the term “peacemaking” to refer to the more specific efforts such as mediation aimed at getting parties to a conflict to reach an agreement

**1. There has been a remarkable growth in awareness and number of actors in peace-building in the last 15 years.**

The peace-building field in Africa today contrasts sharply with what it was in the 1980s. First, there have been numerous civil society organizations, networks and think tanks that have come up throughout Africa that are in many ways ahead of the state actors on peace and conflict issues. Examples include ACCORD and Centre for Conflict Resolution in South Africa, WANEP West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, APFO (African Peace Forum), Nyerere Foundation, in East Africa. There are also numerous other national and community organizations. For example, my organisation has worked with or has been instrumental in the founding of numerous networks and initiatives such as NORRYDA<sup>3</sup> in Northern Ghana; about 800 community committees in the pastoralist areas of North Rift in Kenya; KYPPEDE<sup>4</sup> youth in the slums of Nairobi; Acholi Religious Leaders in Northern Uganda; COPARE<sup>5</sup> in Eastern DRC; Mano River Women's Peace Network in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry.

Secondly, most religious institutions, and especially churches and economical organizations, now have peace, justice and reconciliation ministries or departments within their structures.

Thirdly, with the end of the Cold War, the space has opened up considerably, allowing more actors to take up peace-building roles. Interestingly, governments themselves have been key beneficiaries of the changes since the end of the Cold War. Thus, regional governmental bodies such as IGAD, SADC, and ECOWAS<sup>6</sup> have assumed peacemaking and peacekeeping roles in their respective regions. Nevertheless, there has been a suggestion the centrality accorded regional initiatives in Africa is partly part of the West's effort to relinquish responsibility for Africa's 'burden.'

Fourthly, academic institutions have been among the last to catch on, with a few centres dedicated to peace and conflict studies coming up across the continent.

One could therefore talk of an emerging and growing "peace-building infrastructure" in Africa, made up NGO, governmental, religious and academic institutions. This infrastructure is crucial for the sustainability and ownership of peace-building by those affected.

Of course the phenomenal growth in the number of actors has come with its challenges that may have limited the ability of the various actors to make a difference.

- Capacity and skills: The growth seems to have outstripped the development of capacities, skills, and even the values and discipline to measure up to the complexity of conflicts and peace-building. Capacity needs would include analysis, strategy development, negotiation and mediation, peacekeeping, curriculum development in academic institutions, etc. The capacity and skills need to resonate with the context of conflicts in Africa, and would do well to be informed by the conflict handling traditions of Africa. At the moment, much of the conflict handling and peace-building expertise has been imported from out of the continent. It is gratifying to note that the NePAD

---

<sup>3</sup> Northern Region Youth and Development Association

<sup>4</sup> Kibera Youth Programme for Peace and Development

<sup>5</sup> Conseil Pour la Paix et la Reconciliation

<sup>6</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on development (Horn of Africa); South African Development Community; Economic Community of West African States respectively.

initiative does recognise the need for “building the capacity of African institutions for early warning, prevention, resolution and management of conflicts”<sup>7</sup>.

- “NGO-nisation” and “projectization” of Peacebuilding: For historical reasons, peacebuilding work in Africa has been led mostly by NGOs, whose main operational model is project planning and implementation. Thus the NGO-nisation has led to the “**projectization**” of peace-building. Projects are short-term, time-bound, specific, and are expected to result in concrete outcomes. This project thinking does not resonate well with the long-term process orientation of peace-building.
- Funding constraints: Both NGOs and regional bodies face the challenge of raising the required funds for their work. Both depend too heavily on external and conditional funding. I can testify that it is increasingly difficult to come across funding conditions that are sympathetic to the unpredictability of peace-building. Thus, many actors in the CSOs end up being more preoccupied with survival and favourable positioning *vis a vis* the donor community, than with engaging with the work.
- Evaluation and impact assessment: Questions are being raised regarding how to determine the contribution of the various efforts. Elsewhere, I have argued that evaluation needs to be viewed from the perspective of learning and improvement, rather than from the perspective of survival and credibility. Appropriate frameworks and tools have to be developed that are responsive to the process nature of peace-building.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. **Virtually all recent and current peace processes are Africa-Instituted**

(a) By design or out of pragmatism or necessity, almost all the recent and ongoing peace processes in Africa are Africa-led. From West Africa’s ECOWAS/ECOMOG, to Central and Southern Africa’s SADC, to the Horn of Africa’s IGAD, Africa has taken responsibility and leadership in peace making processes. At the moment, for example, Kenya is leading in the mediation processes for Somalia and Sudan, both within the IGAD framework. ECOWAS is involved in the peacekeeping and mediation in the conflicts in Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia.

(b) The model of the “Elder Statesman” has also come out as uniquely African, with people like former presidents Nelson Mandela, Quet Masire and the late Julius Nyerere, playing roles in the conflicts in the Great Lakes region.

(c) There have also been a number of Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General working on various conflicts in Africa.

All these are indications that Africa’s diplomacy and peacemaking has come of age. Yet this fact of Africa’s ownership of its problems is usually not acknowledged, and contrasts sharply with the pervasive image of Africa as helpless and a burden to the rest of the world. On a recent visit to Sierra Leone, I was struck by the sheer arrogance and presumptuousness of some of the expatriate organisations helping in the reconstruction efforts, especially the training of new security forces. They have little faith in the people they are attempting to help, and believe the

---

<sup>7</sup> New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Core Document (2001), Paragraph 72.

<sup>8</sup> See Wachira, G. (2001) “Practitioners reflections on the Evaluation of Peacebuilding”. Keynote speech at the Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice Conference, Soesterberg, The Netherlands, October 2001. A summary of the paper has been published in the conference report (Galama and van Tongeren, (2002), European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Netherlands. See also NPI-Africa and National Council of Churches of Kenya (2002) “Responsive Evaluation of Peacebuilding: Towards a Learning Model”, an NPI-Africa publication.

country will collapse again as soon as they leave. Yet, in spite of its shortcomings, ECOMOG has demonstrated what can be done with very limited resources and capacity. There lacks, however, a systematic documentation and analysis of these African efforts. Such documentation would avail the lessons emerging from them.

### **3. Mounting Pressure for the Re-definition and Expansion of the Negotiating Table**

One of the great challenges of the dominant model of peacemaking has to do with the criteria for qualifying to sit at the proverbial “negotiating table”. Currently, rule number one seems to be “have a gun, kill many people, demonstrate beyond doubt that you could kill more, and thou shall be invited to the table.” Rule number two is consequent upon the first, and states that, “Men Only.” This means that high-level peace negotiations are usually exclusive to combatants, and that peace is made on the terms of those who waged war. The last few years there have seen a grudging recognition of the role non-combatants could play in peace processes. More specifically, beginning with Somalia’s “Sixth Clan”, women and other civil society groups have forced their way into peace processes. NPI-Africa, together with Femmes l’Afrique Solidarité, have been involved in preparing the participation of women in peace processes for the DRC (Sun City, 2002), the Manu River Union (Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, ongoing) and the ongoing Somali talks in Kenya (ongoing). It is an ironical fact that conflict (or any crisis for that matter) provides as well the opportunity for redefining and renegotiating relationships and structures. The involvement of the marginalized in the renegotiation of peace is therefore to be encouraged, as it shifts attention to those who are affected by wars purportedly fought on their behalf.

### **4. There is an increased recognition of the role of processes of national healing**

Until South Africa came to the scene with the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, the important work of healing of memories and closure after protracted conflicts had been seen as incidental to the building of a sound, developing country and rarely featured in peace agreements in Africa. The thinking behind processes of truth-telling is that societies emerging from atrocious pasts need to process this past in order for healing to take place. Today, countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, are experimenting with truth and justice processes. I shall return to this topic later when I discuss challenges. However, the focus on truth-telling as a mechanism for national reconciliation raises some questions:

- Does truth-telling indeed lead to national healing and reconciliation?
- Is Truth-telling becoming a fad, and a cover for an unwillingness to face up to tough questions of responsibility?
- Or is it becoming a political tool with which new regimes now threaten previous ones?

### **5. A new focus on Early Warning (EW) and Response**

Many people have written about the merits and demerits of conflict early warning, and I need not go into that debate here.<sup>9</sup> EW has emerged as a science of analysis of the structural causes of conflict and risk assessment of how these may interact with immediate triggers to cause

---

<sup>9</sup> I have remained “constructively sceptical” about Early Warning; first because I believe that the one way of ensuring peace and security in Africa is through the long-term process of ensuring sustainable livelihoods, representative governance, and respect for rights. Secondly, responses proposals to EW are usually formulated around proximate or trigger, rather than at the structural/root causes of conflict. This opens current models of EW to the criticism of being concerned only with averting conflict and violence without any attention to underlying causes. From this perspective, early warning can lead to suppression of justified revolt against structural injustices. Nevertheless, I have found useful some elements of the EW methodology, especially the analysis and scenario building, which can be very useful when planning peace-building interventions. For this reason, NPI-Africa has been involved in EW training endeavours in Africa in partnership with WANEP and FEWER.

violence. Early Warning logic suggests that if we know enough early enough we could act to prevent violent conflict. However, we know that there are many political and economic obstacles that make action after warning difficult. The key questions remain who does what when in order to avert a foreseen conflict? Nevertheless, both ECOWAS and IGAD have come up with regional EW mechanisms (Early Warning Mechanisms and Conflict Prevention Programme, and CEWARN, respectively). It remains to be seen whether these new programmes can overcome the challenge of who should do what when in order to prevent violent eruptions of conflicts, and especially surmounting the barriers imposed by claims to sovereignty. It is also worth noting that the NEPAD Core Document (Paragraph 72) identifies the need for capacity building in early warning as part of its Peace and Security Initiative.

## **DILEMMAS/ CHALLENGES**

Some of the challenges facing peace-building in Africa have been mentioned above (especially regarding the rapid expansion and the lack of capacity) while some have been implied. Here, we consider a few more.

### **1. Vertical Linkages and Ability to Engage with the “Bigger Picture”**

An adhering criticism of peace-building work, especially by NGOs, is that it presents the image of people running around much like headless chickens, trying to extinguish one fire after another. This kind of work is focused at the locality of conflict, and constantly fails to address itself to the wider and higher policy-systemic and structural levels.

John Paul Lederach<sup>10</sup> has suggested that peace-building needs to be comprehensive and multi-layered. At one level, it needs to connect levels of action, from the community to top leadership levels. Secondly, it needs to visualize working simultaneously at specific issues of conflict, rebuilding relationships, and addressing the systemic causes of conflict, whether local, national or international. Thirdly, peace-building ought to combine short-term, crisis interventions, with more long-term visioning and mapping for change and desired futures.

This kind of comprehensive thinking often escapes actors in peace-building, whether governmental or civil society. Most prefer to act alone in their comfort zone.

Working in this comprehensive manner calls for deliberate collaboration between local, national and international actors, practitioners and researchers, in trying to impact situations of conflict. For example, many of the areas inhabited by pastoralist communities in Africa are prone to violent conflicts. As these communities often occupy marginal positions (politically and physically), there is a tendency to be insensitive to their conflicts. Yet, the conflicts have much to do with local and national resource management, livelihood sustainability, and international flow of small weapons. A challenge for peace-builders is to develop their capacities to identify and engage with both the local and the bigger pictures of conflicts.

The expansion of the democratic space in Africa offers opportunity for Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and governmental regional integration organizations to forge closer working relations. This would afford CSOs access to hire levels of decision making, while affording regional organizations access to expertise and community mobilization and action. At

---

<sup>10</sup> Lederach, J.P. (1997) *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* Washington: USIP Press

least one regional organization, COMESA, has clearly articulated the need for partnership with CSOs especially in the area of peace and security.

## **2. Rebuilding After Conflict**

Rebuilding societies after conflict and the challenges it poses can be understood at two fundamental levels.

- a) Physical and economic reconstruction: Working in conflict situations, one is usually confronted with the question of what peace would mean in a context where livelihoods have been completely destroyed and people impoverished. The work of physical and economic reconstruction of African countries emerging from conflict, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Angola, etc. is truly daunting. One of my worries regarding the NePAD initiative is that it seems to assume that all African countries are at an equal footing and waiting to be opened up for globalization.
- b) Healing, justice and reconciliation: Violence inevitably leaves deep psychological wounds and continues to affect the collective psyche of the people involved, whether a whole nation or parts of it. After the death of close to 800,000 people in Rwanda, there was very little physical evidence of the atrocity that had just taken place as buildings in the capital remained relatively untouched. In many countries, generations of people have grown up in war environments and have no alternative frames of reference. Children have been targets of or participants in atrocities. Many women have been violated. Limbs have been cut off. Relatives have been killed at the hands of “the enemy.” Thus, those conceptualising and implementing “reconstruction” have to have in mind these very human, non-physical aspects of reconstruction. Increasingly, there is a focus on “transitional justice”, addressing itself to the question of how countries emerging from atrocious conflicts or dictatorship, deal with the past. At the heart of this dilemma is the fact that countries need to make a stand against impunity by punishing those responsible for the violations. At the same time, the countries need to promote healing and reconciliation, which could not be achieved if there were perceptions of witch-hunting. Yet, dealing with past brings out major political, ethical, and financial challenges. On a recent visit to Sierra Leone, I took time to visit the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (charged with “healing the nation”) and the Special Court (to try “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for war crimes and crimes against humanity). The Special Court is in the process of setting up its physical infrastructure such as courts and detention cells. The infrastructure of the Special Court contrasts sharply with the general decay in the city. The construction work seems extensive, and the whole process will no doubt cost millions of dollars. The Registrar shared the details of the architectural design. (I jokingly told the Registrar, he ought to have many people booking themselves in voluntarily, pleading to be indicted, if only to escape from the streets for a while). So far, only 12 people have been indicted before the court. Of these, two have since died (“Moskito” Sam Bockarie and Foday Sankoh), one is enjoying asylum in Nigeria (Charles Taylor), and the whereabouts of one (J. P. Koroma) are not yet known. In the end, it seems very few people will be tried, against a massive cost of operation. The biggest “catch” of the Special Court remains Chief Hinga Norman, leader of the CDF (Civil Defence Force, militias). There is a public perception that his actions were in defence of the state and he should not have been indicted. In its turn, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, like the South Africa one before it, has mostly attracted victims, as supposed perpetrators stay away.

In summary, then, African countries transiting from conflict or undemocratic rule face challenging decisions regarding how to deal with their past and move on.

## **NEPAD AND THE PEACE OF AFRICA**

As indicated in the preliminary remarks, in general terms NePAD is a refreshing initiative whose main promise is to put Africa on the road to economic prosperity and democratic rule. It has long been argued that poverty and lack of opportunities and the attendant hopelessness, have contributed greatly to the conflicts in Africa. Equally, participatory democracy would diminish the conflicts that result from perceptions of exclusion.

As other speakers will be speaking at length on NePAD, I want to only make a few observations.

1. The first is that it appears to be over-ambitious in its anticipation of a build-up of resources (\$64bn a year) and the development of institutional capacities in numerous areas. However, one could also argue that visions are intended to be ambitious.

2. It seems to place too much faith in the neo-liberal ideology of market- and investment-led economic growth. This basically implies buying into globalization and the IMF and World Bank creed of control of state income and expenditure, attracting foreign investments, and creating a conducive atmosphere for market access. In spite of some disquiet about the effects of globalization and the competence of its sponsors and directors such as the IMF, NePAD is calculated to fit with the “globalization game”, not to challenge it. The suggestion by insiders, such as Prof. Joseph Stiglitz<sup>11</sup>, that for example the IMF, to whom we have entrusted the globalization project, do not always know what they are talking about, is quite worrying.

Whereas the tide of globalization appears irreversible, one worries that most countries in Africa (with the possible exception of South Africa) appear ill prepared for it. While not suggesting any conspiracy on the part of South Africa, it is notable that that country would reap the most benefits from the “sub-globalization” of Africa. From the vantage point of South Africa—due to its relative development—it may appear like the rest of Africa is ready to join the global train. Perhaps there is a case for a country by country assessment of “globalization-compliance” or state of “market-readiness”. Even though the NePAD document is detailed in its proposals for capacity building in Africa, it also makes very blanket generalisations, ignoring the fact that Africa is very diverse, and that sometimes that diversity is also reflected within nations. What minimum infrastructural needs? What minimum industrialisation?

3. The logic of export-led growth does not always work. Statistics indicate that Africa now generates 30% more exports than in 1980; yet the value of the exports has plummeted more than 40% because of falling terms of trade (Patrick Bond, 2001). If the events of Cancun this week are anything to go by, this situation is not about to change. Would NePAD have done better making a case for change in the international trade rules?

4. There appears to be a potential clash between the visions and ideologies behind the NePAD initiative, and those behind AU. AU and its predecessor the OAU has espoused the ideals and ideologies of “brotherhood” and “solidarity” of the African continent—“standing up to the world”, if you will. Thus, its greatest mission was the liberation of the continent and the

---

<sup>11</sup> Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) *Globalisation and its Discontents* London: Allen Lane/Penguin

assertion of Africa's place in the world. The need to maintain this ideal of solidarity often clashed with other ideals such as ensuring democracy within the continent as no member state would have questioned another's conduct. NePAD, on the other hand, seems to represent the ideal of Africa's integration into the globalised world, with improved governance, democracy and transparency as the bargaining chips—to “submit to the world.” In this regard, there is a marked silence in the NePAD documents of what would be controversial issues such as reparations for slavery and colonialism, and debt cancellations. Interestingly, Africa's united stand at the Cancun talks seems to represent more the ideals of the AU/OAU, than the submissiveness of NePAD.

5. With regard to the APRM, this is a welcome initiative, because it promises that African leaders will keep an eye on and monitor each other in order to “Exercise constructive peer dialogue and persuasion (through offering assistance or applying appropriate measures) to effect changes in country practice where recommended.” (APRM Mandate, paragraph d). Whether Mr. Mbeki of South Africa would consider himself a “peer” too, say, a Charles Taylor, is another matter. Yet, there is reason to worry that, at best, peace is only given lip service in the NePAD document, and mostly seen from an instrumental perspective: peace is a vehicle for ensuring the inflow and then the safety of external investment. While the document was being drafted and discussed, wasteful conflicts were going on in Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, among others. But worst of all, unprecedented military adventurism was going on in the DRC. If, as we are told, over 3 million people have silently died in the DRC war, then we have every reason to be ashamed of this calamity. Whereas the APRM emphasises the “exercise of constructive peer dialogue”, one hopes there is room as well for “expression of frank indignation” at the conduct of some of the leaders. Can the APRM, intended to ensure leaders are accountable, really work in the face of vested interests of many of the leaders?

Liberia may be held as the first “success” of the new African resolve to rid itself of embarrassing leaders. In spite of the criticism that Charles Taylor ought to have been handed over to the Special Court in Sierra Leone, it is also apparent that a choice had to be made between prolonging the conflict in Liberia and offering amnesty to its main architect. With Taylor out in exile, it remains to be seen whether his asylum will be dishonoured.

## **CONCLUSION**

It is obvious that much progress has been made in the area of peace-building in Africa in the last 10 years. The NePAD initiative promises to help address the structural causes of conflict in Africa, found in governance and the impoverishment of people. However, NePAD's promise is founded on a faith in the market and globalisation forces that are not known to be people-centred. I nevertheless remain convinced that, in spite of the pain of today, in the broad stroke of time, Africa is changing and has a bright future. I see nurturing and actualisation of that hope as the duty and responsibility of all workers for justice and peace.